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Toward a Rationale for the Use of
Expert Testimony in Obscenity
Litigation
Charles M. Stern
I. INTRODUCTION
TATUTES AIMED at suppressing "obscene" matter have created
* immense confusion.' In a narrow perspective the familiar
judicial process; through which statutes slowly gather an accretion
of meaning by interpretive gloss, has been inadequate to provide
clarification of acceptable
boundaries. In a broader per-
THE AuTHoR: CHARLES M. STR spective the legal process has
(A.B., Harvard College; LLB., Harvard produced embarrassments with-
Law School) is a member of the Cali-
fornia Bar. in the profession and cyni-
cism without, not merely be-
cause of the ponderous mech-
anisms which are brought to bear on problems for which those
mechanisms seem inappropriate, but also because of the bewildering
results of the litigated cases, in which virtually no laymen (and few
candid lawyers) can discern rational patterns of decision. As a re-
sult, it has become common to hear strong advocacy for the position
that the only tolerable censor is a dead one, and that the sooner
legislatures free the law from the futile and demeaning task of arbi-
trating tastes, the better for all concerned.'
The wisdom of such advocacy is not a concern of this Article.
For our purposes here - and for the bar and bench today - obscen-
ity statutes are the "given" in the problem. Whether or not obscene
matter actually does have a deleterious influence on its readers, there
abound spokesmen for religious, educational, and law enforcement
organizations who positively assert the existence of such an influ-
ence.' There are too many legislative findings that obscene mate-
'The most recent exploration of the difficulties may be found in R. KUH, FOOLISH
FIGLEAVES? PORNOGRAPHY IN - OUT OF - COURT (1967).
2 See, e.g., M. ERNST & W. SEAGLE, To THE PURE .. .A STUDY OF OBSCENITY
AND THE CENSOR (1928).
3 See SUBCOMM. TO INVESTIGATE JUVENILE DELINQUENCY, INTERIm REPORT
TO THE COMM. ON THE JuIciARY, S. REP. No. 2381, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. passim
(1956).
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rial causes crime to hope that legislators will become convinced
otherwise and repeal obscenity statutes.4 During the first session of
the 90th Congress, 19 bills were introduced citing the "grave na-
tional concern" in the traffic of obscenity and proposing a hodge-
podge commission (the "Commission on Noxious and Obscene Mat-
ters and Materials," or the "Commission for Elimination of Porno-
graphic Materials"), composed of representatives from the profes-
sions and industries involved, to investigate and recommend more
effective controls.' "Of the national community's contemporary
standards we know only that contemporary American society rejects
and will not tolerate the dissemination of hard-core pornography."'
Once one recognizes that public demand for at least nominal
legal censorship makes repeal an academic (not a practical) ques-
tion, one must turn to the challenge of intelligent application of the
statutes. Police, administrative boards, prosecutors, courts, and citi-
zens themselves all represent interdependent institutions which play
a part in the application of obscenity laws. Only one facet of such
application by a single institution, the judiciary, will be examined
in this Article: the use of expert testimony in the course of obscenity
litigation.
My thesis is that the word "obscene" cannot be defined, and that
as a result, experts are called upon to provide specific information
about the challenged work so that, under the guise of determining
that the work is obscene, the court can legislate ad hoc by prohibit-
ing further circulation. I wish to show, for a variety of reasons, that
the only utility of expert testimony lies in providing information
and that such testimony cannot be the sole basis for drawing legal
conclusions that the challenged work is obscene - or, in other words,
that such testimony merits legal proscription.
II. THE CONCEPTUAL ENIGMA
A. Variations on a Definitional Theme
At the outset, there must be some understanding of what one
seeks expert testimony about in obscenity litigation. Definitions of
obscenity have proven to be hopeless - as the synonymous stutter-
ings of many statutes demonstrate.7 Nevertheless, the impossibility
4Id. at 2, 62.
5S. 188, 1584; H.R. 299, 383, 429, 559, 1457, 2369, 2525, 3394, 5802, 6798,
6711, 7057, 10032, 10347, 10892, 11449, 11824, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
6 Lockhart & McClure, Censorship of Obscenity: The Developing Constitutional
Standards, 45 MINN. L. REV. 5, 112 (1960).
7 See, e.g., Tariff Act of 1930 § 305, 19 U.S.C. § 1305 (1964); 18 U.S.C. § 1461
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of definition does not foreclose analysis of the reasons why various
thinkers resort to concepts of the obscene. Emphasis in the pre-
ceding sentence should, of course, be placed on the plural concepts;
for there is no single idea represented by the word obscene in all
contexts. In a brilliant article exploring the kaleidoscopic nature
of obscenity as an aesthetic concept, Abraham Kaplan has observed
that "[j]udgments of obscenity vary because they are contextual....
[Ojbscenity is to be found in words or pictures only in so far as
these can be interpreted to have a certain meaning; and meaning it-
self is contextual."
These differing contexts may be cultural: "Alice's Adventures
in Wonderland was banned in Hunan province of China in 1911 on
the ground that 'animals should not use human language, and that
it was disastrous to put animals and human beings on the same
level.' "I A more pronounced example is that of the
cultivated Chinese gentleman [who] . . . remarked that the pro-
nounced and regular rhythms of the Sousa march, "The Stars and
Stripes Forever," played by a Marine band, seemed to him almost
unbearably lascivious and suggestive of coitus; Chinese classical
music, even in dealing with love episodes, is quite discernibly dif-
ferent.10
However, culture and society should not be considered the sole
or even the major - lines of contextual demarcation. For within
a given society, contexts will also differ historically;"- and within
any given historical era of a society, the meaning of obscene may vary
in -the context of different intellectual disciplines. This is readily
understandable in light of the varying purposes which value judg-
(1964) (non-mailable matter); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 12-1102 (1963) ("obscene, im-
moral, lewd, or lascivious"). Recent amendments to state statutes have followed the
definition of the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code § 207.10 (2) (Tent.
Draft No. 6, 1957): "A thing is obscene if, considered as a whole, its predominant ap-
peal is to prurient interest, i.e., a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex or excre-
tion, and if it goes substantially beyond customary limits or candor in description or
representation of such matters." See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 11-20 (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1969; N.Y. PENAL LAw § 235.00 (McKinney 1967).
8 Kaplan, Obscenity as an Esthetic Category, 20 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROB. 544, 545
(1955).
9 He Who Destroyes a Good Booke, Kills Reason It Selfe - An Exhibition of
Books Which Have Survived Fire, the Sword and the Censors 27 (1955) (annotation on
file in Kansas University Library).
10 La Barre, Obscenity: An Anthropological Appraisal, 20 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB.
533, 536 (1955).
" For example, in 1923 Professor Bliss Perry of Harvard deemed it noteworthy
that Harvard undergraduates - unlike their fathers and grandfathers - were being
officially exposed to Fielding's Tom Jones. Perry, Pernicious Books, Address to The
New England Watch and Ward Society at Old South Church, April 22, 1923, at 6.
(The address, incidentally, was commendatory of the audience's activities.)
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ments serve in the different disciplines. To the social scientist, the
fact that given matter is perceived by his subjects as obscene may be
quite telling. An excellent illustration is provided by anthropologist
William La Barre:
[T]he existence of this segregated "reserved section" [in the mu-
seum of the University of San Marcos in Lima, Peru, where there is
kept pottery decorated with scenes of sexual activity] is an ethno-
graphic commentary on our own society, not that of the ancient
Peruvians. The same principle holds for the Christian tourist view-
ing the "obscene" carvings on the famous Hindu temple at
Benares; he may have met all these things before in Krafft-Ebing,
but he finds them unexpected or out of context in a religious
edifice.' 2
Similarly, the concept of the obscene may help psychologists to
classify categories of human responses to stimuli presented in the
form of prose or pictures,' 3 or to identify patterns of verbal inter-
course, such as that described by Freud in his explanation of wit as
a means "whereby forbidden sexual exhibition may obtain release
without arousing disgust.' '14 Yet to Sir Herbert Read (Charles Eliot
Norton Professor of Poetry at Harvard, 1953-54, and scholar of the
fine arts) the concept is not so much a tool for classifying behav-
ioral phenomena as it is a manifestation of massive societal malad-
justments: "Pornography, like delinquency in general, is a social
problem and it can only be solved by methods that involve social
psychology - group analysis and group therapy. . . . Attempts to
deal with the problem in any more isolated fashion are either igno-
rant or hypocritical."' 5
As one turns from the social sciences to the humanities, one
finds obscenity to be an even more protean concept. To Anais Nin,
who wrote the preface for Henry Miller's Tropic of Cancer, obscene
did not mean socially corrupting or deserving of proscription. As
was explained in court by several literary critics,' 6 the preface writer
had employed the word subjectively in reference to "everything
that is outrageous and brutal about life rather than in the sense that
we [here in court] are thinking of obscenity in this trial of sexual
12 La Barre, supra note 10, at 534.
13 See Cairns, Paul & Wishner, Sex Censorship: The Assumptions of Anti-Obscen-
ity Laws and the Empirical Evidence, 46 MINN. L. REv. 1009 (1962).
14 Abse, Psychodynamic Aspects of the Problem of Definition of Obscenity, 20
LAW & CONTEMP, PROB. 572, 580 (1955).
15 DOES PORNOGRAPHY MATrER? 120 (C. Roiph ed. 1961).
16 Intervenor's Appeal at 68, Attorney General v. A Book Named Tropic of Cancer,
345 Mass. 11, 184 N.E.2d 328 (1962).
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license or corruption through sexual descriptions. ' 17  Other liter-
ary critics, however, question the very assumption that there is such
a thing as obscenity in the realm of imaginative writing. William
Phillips, a recent contributor to the Partisan Review, sees pornog-
raphy as an essentially non-literary concern: "[1If there is a prob-
lem, it is legal and social, not literary."' 8  Another critic, Susan
Sontag, challenges the traditional antithesis between "pornography"
and "literature" and conceives of art as a "dialectic or outrage."' 9
The conclusion must be that no meaning of obscene can emerge
until the purpose underlying the use of the word is known.0 As
simple and obvious as this proposition may appear, it seems often
overlooked in the process of interrogating expert witnesses in ob-
scenity cases. The 1965 Massachusetts litigation over John Cle-
land's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure (Fanny Hill) offers a
good example of such oversight. The Attorney General's first wit-
ness on opening was Dr. John E. Collins, Headmaster of the New-
man Preparatory School.- With few preliminary questions to
establish the witness's particular qualifications or to demonstrate
the context in which the witness's evaluation of the book had been
conducted, the prosecutor began: "In your opinion, is this book ob-
scene, Doctor?"2 The court was more perceptive than counsel
when it observed immediately thereafter the underlying contextual
dichotomy: "I can recognize that the legal concept of what obscene
means is one thing; however, a concept of what obscene means in
literature has some bearing on determining what the legal concept
of obscene means. '23  Though the prosecutor failed to capitalize on
the help afforded by the court's perception, the distinction seems to
have persisted in the judge's mind throughout the course of his sub-
sequent rulings on admissibility of evidence.24  Interestingly, the
17 Intervenor's Appeal, supra note 16, at 99.
18 Phillips, Writing About Sex, 34 PARTIsAN REv. 552, 557 (1967).
19 Sontag, The Pornographic Imagination, 34 PARTISAN REv. 181, 189 (1967).20 This was grasped long ago by Lord Lyndhurst, who was troubled by the use of
the word in the 1857 bill that became Lord Campbell's Act (Obscene Publications Act
of 1857), 20 & 21 Vict., ch. 83 (1857). The learned peer asked his colleagues:
"[What is the interpretation which is to be put upon the word 'obscene'? I can
easily conceive that two men will come to entirely different conclusions as to its mean-
ing." Lord Lyndhurst went on to suggest that the word could be used as a tool for
governmental destruction of art works such as Correggio's Jupiter and Antiope. M.
BRNST & A. ScHWARTz, CENsoRSIP: THE SEARcH FOR TBE OBSCENE 23 (1964).
21 Record at 10, A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure"
v. Attorney General, 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
221d. at 11.
23 Id.
24 In response to intervenor's objection to the question whether the witness thought
1969]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20: 527
same observation was made by the court in the widely-publicized
1960 litigation in London concerning D.H. Lawrence's novel Lady
Chatterly's Lover. When the prosecutor asked an academic wit-
ness, "Would you think this was a proper book for people who at-
tend your lectures and your classes to read and discuss ?" Mr. Justice
Byrne interrupted: "The word 'proper' is a little ambiguous.... I
take it you mean from the literary merit point of view. . . . It
might be 'proper' from another angle. That is the difficulty about
this case. You have two separate compartments." To which the
prosecutor responded: "Yes, my Lord." 5
B. A Reconciliation
The first shaft of light illuminating the confusing word "ob-
scene" emanates from the question: how and why is the label being
used? As Abraham Kaplan comments: "To the question 'Who is
to judge whether a work is obscene?' we can reply with the counter-
questions, 'What is to be done with the judgment when it is made?
And why is it being made at all?' "26 For the social scientist, the
concept serves as a shorthand method for classifying certain mani-
festations of man's suppressed interests, or for convenient reference
to certain classes of responses which are evoked because of sup-
pressed matter. Whether or not matter or response should be
termed obscene is merely of methodological concern. The label
will be employed as a means of hypothetical identification; it will
serve only to describe those observed phenomena which precede the
invocation of the label. For example, in the passage taken from La
Barre,27 it becomes clear that the Christian tourist's shocked per-
ception of the Hindu carvings is the phenomenon upon which the
anthropologist's attention is focused and that such observation
would retain its significance for him regardless of the descriptive
word used to identify the tourist's reaction. Nothing of conse-
quence turns on the use of the word "obscene"; for the labeling fol-
lows, and is incidental to, the significant occurrence (the tourist's
reaction to the carvings).
Similarly, to the litterateur, the concept of obscenity serves as a
the book to be patently offensive, the court said, "[A] side from the legal definition of
'patently offensive,' it might be a literary definition of it, or understanding. In that
sense, I think the question is admissible." Id. at 14-15.
2 5 
THE TRIAL OF LADY CHATTERLY - RiEGINA V. PENGUIN BooKs LIMITED
135 (C. Rolph ed. 1961).
2 6 Kaplan, supra note 8, at 546.
2 7 See note 12 supra & accompanying text.
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comparative shorthand. The work labeled obscene seems to him
less worthy of critical attention, perhaps less indicative of sustained
artistic endeavor, than other works to which a reader may direct his
attention. The critic presupposes the existence, past and future, of
the labeled work and calls it obscene in an effort to provide a crit-
ical category within which the labeled work is to be regarded in re-
lation to other works. The judgment here, too, exists independent
of the phenomenon - a piece of writing among other writings -
and the judgment goes to the question of how the work will be
most intelligently thought of in its continued circulation, not to the
question of whether it is to have any continued circulation at all.
This is the crux of the distinction sensed by the Fanny Hill and
Lady Chatterly courts in the remarks previously quoted.28 The
critic's invocation of the label "obscene" involves no necessary judg-
ment about the propriety of the work's continued circulation. How-
ever, the latter question is at the very core of litigation concerning
allegedly obscene publications.
The analysis outlined above points to two important areas of
exploration. If it is useful to conceive of not a single concept of
obscenity but of various concepts, used for different ends in the
social sciences and the humanities, it will also be useful to deter-
mine how these concepts can be utilized with greatest instruction and
least confusion in the process of calling expert witnesses to testify
in obscenity trials. Thus, the next portion of this Article will at-
tempt to establish both perspective and workable goals for this
testimonial process and to identify the theoretical and practical dif-
ficulties involved in achieving those goals. The second important
area of exploration shall constitute the final portion of our ration-
ale: not only does a heavy responsibility fall upon the shoulders
of expert witnesses, whose value judgments must be directed at a
disciplinary interpretation of the challenged publication rather than
toward the legitimacy of its existence; but so also is there a heavy
burden on the trier of fact, whose judgment alone must strike to
the basic issue of the legitimate availability of the challenged work.
III. INSIGHT INTO A RATIONALE
There is no satisfying rationale for expert -testimony when it is
presented in the form of a parade of opinions as to whether or not
the challenged publication is obscene. Such a procedure fails to
demonstrate that each witness uses the term in a way unique to his
2 8 See notes 22-25 supra & accompanying text.
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intellectual discipline (and probably to his own tastes). Even if
the witness understands that he is to speak solely to the legal ques-
tion, whether the challenged work is obscene so as to merit legal
suppression, his response provides no help to the judge and jury in
their task of giving meaning to the words of the applicable statute.
Once, however, one perceives that the witnesses can offer a variety
of intellectual judgments, and not simply yes-or-no responses to a
single legal issue, the contours of the task begin to emerge.
In deciding if expert witnesses will be of use in applying a given
statute, it is necessary to arrive upon at least tentative conclusions
concerning what the applicable statute is meant to control. Due to
the similarity among obscenity statutes in American jurisdictions, it
is possible to generalize about statutory purpose.
A. From a Common Law to a Statutory Basis
Six years ago there appeared in the Columbia Law Review an
outstanding analysis by Professor Louis Henkin concerning the his-
torical and psychological sources of current obscenity statutes.29 The
thesis of his article is that:
[D]espite common assumptions and occasional rationalizations ...
obscenity laws are not principally motivated by any conviction that
obscene materials inspire sexual offenses. Obscenity laws, rather,
are based on traditional notions, rooted in this country's religious
antecedents of governmental responsibility for communal and in-
dividual "decency" and "morality."3 0
Antecedents of current statutes were founded upon "aspirations to
holiness and propriety. Laws against obscenity have appeared con-
joined and cognate to laws against sacrilege and blasphemy, sug-
gesting concern for the spiritual welfare of the person exposed to it
and for the moral well-being of the community."'"
Henkin's thesis about the motivational origins of obscenity stat-
utes does have practical significance. It is dear, for example, that
inducement to evil thoughts (not to reprehensible action) was being
attacked in Commonwealth v. Holmes,"2 the 1821 Fanny Hill litiga-
tion. The indictment alleged that:
[Diefendant, "being a scandalous and evil-disposed person, and
contriving, devising and intending, the morals as well of youth as
2 9 Henkin, Morals and the Constitution: The Sin of Obscenity, 63 CoLuM. L. REV.
391 (1963).
30ld. at 391.
31 d. at 393-94.
32 17 Mass. 336 (1821).
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of other good citizens of said commonwealth to debauch and cor-
rupt, and to raise and create in their minds inordinate and lustful
desires . . . did utter, publish and deliver . . . a certain lewd,
wicked, scandalous, infamous and obscene printed book .... 1133
The indictment rested upon no statute -but upon jurisdiction found
by the court to support prosecution for a common law misdemeanor.
Lord Radcliffe has explained the theory behind this common law
criminal jurisdiction:
So the Common Law, perhaps a little surprised to discover that it
was expected to have a doctrine about something which it had al-
ways supposed would be taken care of by other means, came for-
ward with the theory that, as the king's peace was broken by acts
against the constitution or against religion or against morality, it
was an offence at common law to corrupt the morals of the king's
subjects in other respects.3 4
When the common law jurisdiction to prosecute for obscene pub-
lications was replaced by statutory authorization, the language
and the rationale - of the 1821 Fanny Hill indictment carried over
into later opinions. In 1945, for example, the Massachusetts Su-
preme Judicial Court upheld a conviction under its obscenity stat-
ute, explaining that the book Strange Fruit, by Lillian Smith, "con-
tains much that, even in this post-Victorian era, would tend to pro-
mote lascivious thoughts and to arouse lustful desire in the minds of
substantial numbers of -that public into whose hands this book, ob-
viously intended for general sale, is likely to fall . . ... 3 What
readers would think, regardless of how they would be prompted to
act, had obviously become the primary ,issue in obscenity litigation.
B. The Psychology Behind Statutory Purpose
Henkin's thesis - of obscenity as sin rather than crime - sug-
gests that obscenity statutes emanate from profound psychological
compulsions within the law-making and law-enforcing elements of
our population, and differ significantly from other criminal stat-
utes which are more explicitly molded to meet specific societal dys-
functions. Thus, it appears appropriate to explore more fully the
psychological origins of obscenity law. For if a keener understand-
ing of statutory purpose emerges, the way will have been cleared to
33id. (emphasis added).34 Lord Raddiffe, Censors 12 (The Rede Lectures, delivered at the University of
Cambridge, May 4, 1961).
35 Commonwealth v. Isenstadt, 318 Mass. 543, 556-57, 62 N.E.2d 840, 847 (1945).
Cf. People v. Vanguard Press, Inc., 84 N.Y.S.2d 427, 192 Misc. 127 (City Magis. Ct
N.Y. 1947) ("sexually demoralizing").
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more readily ascertain those constitutional boundaries which may
circumscribe the intended operation of the statutes. Knowing what
the draftsmen sought to suppress and how far the statutes constitu-
tionally may go toward such suppression will make it possible to
formulate more clearly the questions which are properly to be posed
for expert opinion during the course of an obscenity trial. Hope-
fully, what shall emerge is the conclusion that Henkin's thesis is
correct, that the first amendment - and, for purposes of state reg-
ulation, the 14th amendment - now circumscribes quite narrowly
the permissible purpose and intended operation of obscenity statutes,
and that only a certain area of questioning is relevant in deciding
whether a given work -is within the radius of proscription of the ap-
plicable statute.
Though Henkin was not concerned with the psychological un-
derpinnings of his thesis, he suggested implicitly that obscenity stat-
utes serve as legitimated formulations of certain psychological as-
sertions. These propositions may be classified as follows: first, that
"impure" thoughts are not the natural products of our minds but
may be explained simply as products of corrupting forces originat-
ing outside our minds; second, that these corrupting forces are often
purposive and may be directed by our enemies; and third, that, de-
spite the first two notions, "we" are morally superior to "others"
who are susceptible to corrupting forces and therefore "we" are
obliged to provide "them" with legal protection from those forces.
(i) Outside Corrupting Forces.- The first assertion mani-
fests an unconscious reluctance to recognize opprobrious thoughts
as inherent in our own minds. Obscene matter is a scapegoat; it
rationalizes our own impure thoughts and provides an easy explana-
tion for those of others. But the utility of the concept necessarily
depends upon an assumption that what one reads has more than a
temporary effect on his mental processes. That this is so, as a gen-
eral proposition of experience, seems undeniable; indeed, it is para-
doxical that liberal opponents of censorship often argue that what
one reads does not affect his character.
It would be, of course, a poor service to the cause of intellectual
and artistic freedom . . . to assert that literature has no effect on
conduct and morals. Indeed, one of the potential values of litera-
ture is that it does exercise a great influence; and the importance
of freedom is that it allows the good to be distinguished from the
bad.3 6
36 A. CRAIG, SUPPRESSED BooKs: A HISTORY OF THIi CONcEPTION OF ITERARY
OBSCENITY
This experienced effect of what we read upon what we think af-
fords two arguments for the advocates of censorship. The argu-
ment writ small concerns the corrupting effect which obscene mat-
ter is alleged to have on an otherwise unsullied mind. Anthony
Comstock, architect and arch-spirit of the 19th century New York
Society for the Suppression of Vice, went to ludicrous ends in urg-
ing the dangerous effects of objectionable reading matter: "[B]oys
and girls have become so bedevilled by the trashy books and crim-
inal stories upon which their minds have fed, that they have run
away from home to fight Indians and joined themselves together in
bandit bands to pillage and plunder."3 7  Comstock delighted in
boasting of the confessions which supposedly came from the mouths
of the corrupted themselves:
Our Agent arrested a young man nineteen years of age, for ad-
vertising and sending through the mails, under about a dozen
aliases, the most obscene matter. While searching for this vile
trash in his sleeping room in his father's house, the Agent found a
mass of these Boys Papers piled up in one comer. No sooner had
they been discovered than the prisoner started back, exclaiming
with great force, "There, there's the cause of my ruin - that has
cursed me and brought me to this !"38
Arguers for the existence of corrupting effects find particularly ir-
resistible those metaphors which suggest infection, poisoning, and
pollution. Discussions of the subject are peppered with phrases
such as "keeping the roads dean and the air sweet,"39 "pollution in
the rivers," 40 and "as dangerous as dope itself."41  Long ago, on the
OBsc, nng 213 (1963). (Also published in 1962 in Great Britain under the title,
The Banned Books of England and Other Countries - A Study of Literary Obscenity.)
3 7 NEw YoRK SocIETY FOR THE SUPPREssION or VicE, TwENTY-THmD AN-
NUAL REPORT 19 (1897).
3 8 NEw YoRK SOcIETY FOR THE SuPPREssION OF VICE, SIXTH ANNUAL REPORT
7 (1880). Cf. DANTE, INFERNo, Canto V, lines 127-38 (J. Sinclair trans. 1961),
where the poet relates his encounter with Francesca da Rimini. She tells him:
We read one day for pastime of Lancelot, how love constrained him. We
were alone and had no misgiving. Many times that reading drew our eyes
together and changed the colour in our faces, but one point alone it was that
mastered us; when we read that the longed-for smile was kissed by so great a
lover, he who never shall be parted from me, all trembling, kissed my mouth.
A Geleotto was the book and he that wrote it; that day we read in it no far-
ther.
The poet reflects: "Alas, how many sweet thoughts, how great desire, brought them to
the woeful pass!"
39 Lord Radcliffe, supra note 34, at 19.
40 Hearings on H.R. 2542 Before Subcomm. No. 1 of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., at 77 ("Mailing of Obscene Matter") (1958) (remarks
of Mrs. Clarence T. Nelson for the United Churchwomen).
41 Id. at 24 (remarks of Representative Chelf of Kentucky).
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floor of the Senate, one speaker observed that "deleterious litera-
ture" is comparable to "narcotic drugs," 42 and another likened im-
ported obscenity to hoof-and-mouth disease and "germs that kills
[sic] the hog."43 Such imagery has led one student of the subject to
assert that "[jm]uch of the justification for intolerance derives its
authority from false analogies, wrongfully carried over from physi-
cal relations into the reaim of the psychic ....
The argument writ large identifies obscenity as the symptom of
a decaying society. In the recent Fanny Hill case, an amicus curiae
brief presented to the United States Supreme Court argued that "the
law's concern is with the more generally accepted [query] historical
notion [citing Arnold Toynbee] that a society in which obscene
material is readily available is not a healthy society and is heading
downhill. ' 45 The argument concluded with the ominous statement
that Fanny Hill was evidence that "we are closing the gap on the
community of Sodom and Gomorrah." 4
For both those who fear others' impure thoughts and those who
dread our collective historical demise, the mechanical suppression
of obscenity seems to be a way of avoiding perplexing psychological
explanations for the workings of the human mind, of exonerating
the mind from responsibility for its own impurities, and of objec-
tifying fears which can then be fought openly - with legal weap-
ons. It is important to emphasize that despite the gray areas which
lay between the black and white poles of thought and conduct, the
concern here described is one solely for the mental (or moral) re-
sults alleged to follow from exposure to obscenity. The censorious
concern seeks expression in statutory control aimed principally at
thought, not action. Action comes too late.
(ii) Purposeful Enemy Direction.- The second psychological
assertion which obscenity statutes may serve to legitimate is that
the corrupting forces described above are often purposive and may
be directed by our enemies. Underlying this assertion, of course,
has been a 'high degree of anxiety concerning the quality of any
given work. Such fear was best expressed by a minister when he
42 71 CONG. REc. 4438 (1929) (remarks of Senator Barkley of Kentucky). This
comparison, however, prompted the immediate protest that "ftlhere is no connection at
all between opium and a book." Id. at 4470 (remarks of Senator Tydings of Maryland).
43 71 CONG. REc. 4470 (1929).
4 4 A. CRAIG, supra note 36, at 41 (footnote omitted).
4 5 Amicus Curiae Brief of Citizens for Decent Literature, Inc., at 67, A Book Named
"John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney General, 383 U.S. 413
(1966).
46Id
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testified that the better written an allegedly obscene book, so much
the worse - for it is that much more insidious.4 7  Often, those
works challenged as obscene are seen as set afloat upon pure Amer-
ican waters by agents of a communist conspiracy; or it may be less
extremely asserted that the circulation of obscene matter gravely
hinders the country in 'its cold war with communism. A church
spokesman testifying before a congressional subcommittee investi-
gating the mailing of obscene matter announced solemnly that
"[wihen all the hydrogen bombs and ICBM's are lined up - the
free world facing the Communist world - survival will depend on
the moral character of our men, women, and children."48 The testi-
mony fell on the sympathetic ears of a Congressman who said, "I
think that the commies would like to see this sort of thing go on. 49
Sometimes, however, this fear of the conspiratorial subversion of
American morality can assume almost humorous forms. A volun-
teer reader from the National Organization for Decent Literature (a
Catholic citizens' group which seeks to control community outlets of
obscene literature) misconstrued the Organization's stringent cri-
teria of appraisal and found offensive a pocket-book edition of
Barnard Pares' Russia. "[T]he report ...stated that passages in
this book described conditions in Russia that were, according to the
Committee's code, objectionable."8 "
(iii) Moral Superiority of the Standard-Bearer.- The final
assertion underlying motivation for enactment and enforcement of
obscenity statutes is that "others," possessing less self-control than
1we," require censorship for their own good. This subjective asser-
tion of moral superiority, like the first assertion of cause and effect,
has been applied in both the microcosm and the macrocosm. In the
former instance, the asserter expresses fear that others, less well
educated, less stable temperamentally, less judicious in judgment,
will succumb to the debasing influence of obscene material. Not
only has this feeling influenced the diligence of prosecutors; 51 but,
47 Gertz, The 'Tropic of Cancer" Litigation in Illinois, 51 Ky. I.J. 595, 609 (1963).
4 8 Hearings, supra note 40, at 93 (remarks of Mr. Martin H. Work, Executive Di-
rector, National Council of Catholic Men).
49 Id. at 24 (remarks of Representative Chelf of Kentucky).
50 Twomey, The Citizens' Committee and Comic-Book Control: A Study of Extra-
governmental Restraint, 20 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROB. 621,628 (1955).
51 In his closing argument to the court in the 1965 Fanny Hill case in Boston, the
prosecutor said:
I necessarily read this book prior to trying this case. I am not a literary ex-
pert, although I did major in English in college. I am not one easily offended,
but I was offended by this book, and I feel there is no literary merit in it. It
... did arouse prurient interest and impure thoughts in me. Fortunately I
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as seen in the following striking example, so also has it affected
determinations by the jury:
After convicting What Happens, by John Herrman, in New York
City in 1927, several jurors came up and shook hands with the
defeated author. The jurors were in a good humor for they had
retained the exhibits, the copies of the condemned book. "And
why did you vote against my book?" queried the author. The
masculine answer was direct and typical, more honest than can
usually be expected. "You see, that book wouldn't hurt me. I
wasn't scared by the mention of masturbation. But then I felt it
might hurt some other people ....- 52
In arguing for the defendant publisher in the London Lady Chat-
terly case, Mr. Gerald Gardner, Q.C., emphasized that, in obscenity
litigation, "[n]obody suggests the Judge or the Jury become de-
praved or corrupted. It is always somebody else, it is never our-
selves." 53 The attitude reaches its most extreme expression when
the arguer for censorship conceives of himself (as did Anthony
Comstock) as an agent of God, whose task is to cleanse the impure
and redeem the debauched. 54
On the level of the macrocosm, the assertion of moral superior-
ity takes the form of a xenophobic comparison of national char-
acters. A witness before the Senate subcommittee investigating the
mailing of obscene matter testified that:
My experience, from my visits to foreign countries, is that the
standard is very high in the United States, that we are an extremely
moral people, and that in general our standard is considerably
higher than in other places where I have been. 55
More vitriolically, a Senator asserted that customs censorship was
required because of the "unfit horde of foreigners that formerly
poured in here," bringing their sub-American cultures with them.56
Anthony Comstock reported the shock experienced by a New York
City gentleman who found, in a reputable Fifth Avenue bookstore,
"little French salesmen who will sell the stuff ["books in French
am well adjusted enough so it did not affect my daily life, but I wonder if that
could be said for everyone who has access to a book of this nature. Record,
supra note 21, at 99-100.
52 M. ERNST & W. SEAGLE, supra note 2, at 6.
5 3 THE TRIAL OF LADY CHATrERLY, supra note 25, at 37. See also Gosling, Essay
in DOES PORNOGRAPHY MATrER? 64 (C. Rolph ed. 1961).
54 NEw YORK SOCIETY FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF VICE, supra note 37, at 27-33.
55 Hearings, supra note 40, at 40 (remarks of Mr. Abe Goff, General Counsel, Post
Office Department).
5671 CONG. REc. 4470 (1929) (remarks of Senator Heflin of Alabama).
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that are simply filthy"] to any married woman who will buy, and
alas! these -are not few ....
The suspicions aroused by a book written in a foreign language
produce some of the supreme ironies of censorship. "An English
journalist said at a public dinner given to honor Anatole France in
London that his countrymen were pleased to honor a master whom
they undoubtedly would have put in jail if he had written in Eng-
lish." ' On the other hand, Senator Bronson Cutting of New Mex-
ico - while urging an end to the censorship imposed by administra-
tive personnel (customs officials) - called the attention of his
colleagues to the absurdity that the Arabian Nights was, in 1929,
importable both in the original and in the literal English transla-
-ions of Payne and Burton, but the French translation by Mardrus
was excluded." The spectacle presents itself as a Swiftian battle of
the books on an international scale, in which "[w]e aver patrioti-
cally that the pornography which floods our country comes from
France, and France accuses Germany of slandering its fair name by
putting Parisian imprints upon its native smut, and Ireland accuses
England and the United States."' 0
C. The Utility of Psychology: From General to Particular
The foregoing has been an attempt to corroborate Henkin's the-
sis of obscenity as sin rather than crime. If Henkin is correct, ob-
scenity statutes spring from concern with good and evil as well as
concern with legal remedies more objectively fashioned to meet vis-
ible social dysfunctions. Once the hypothesized concern with good
and evil is broken down into the three psychological manifestations
(the desire for an exculpating explanation of impure thoughts; the
5 7 NEW YORK SOCIETY FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF VICE, supra note 37, at 8.
5 8 X ERNST & W. SEAGLE, supra note 2, at 58.
59 71 CONG. REc. 4434 (1929) (debate over H.R. 2667, a tariff revision bill which
became the Hawley-Smoot Act). Senator Cutting did not express opposition to all
legal censorship. He wished only to put the issue to state legislatures and courts, for
administrative officers seemed to him ill-suited to play the role of the censor. Cf.
Canadian Bar Association, A Report of the Saskatchewan Sub-Commv. on Civil Liberties
on Censorship and Obscenity, June, 1960, 25 SASK. BAE. REv. 80 (1960); AMERICAN
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, WHAT'S OBScNE? (1944), both arguing against adminis-
trative censorship.
60 A. ERNST & W. SEAGLE, supra note 2, at 183. But see Zeitlin v. Arnebergh, 59
Cal. 2d 901, 383 P.2d 152, 31 Cal. Rptr. 800, cert. denied, 375 U.S. 957 (1963),
where the attitude was turned around in a decision denying governmental power to
proscribe: '"he danger of state censorship has been too graphically demonstrated by
the current decadence of Soviet art for us to assume that either Roth or the Legislature
intended to [impose upon the culture of society] such debilitation." 59 Cal. 2d at 922,
383 P.2d at 166, 31 Cal. Rptr. at 814.
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desire to objectify, and thus combat more efficiently, threats per-
ceived to emanate from -hostile sources; and the desire to satisfy one-
self of one's own moral superiority), the validity of the thesis be-
comes susceptible to more specific demonstration. But this is not to
suggest that concern with obscenity as sin takes only the three de-
scribed manifestations. Individual purposiveness is always com-
plex; group purposiveness, such as legislative intent, must therefore
be complexity compounded many times over. It does suggest, how-
ever, that the statements offered, presumably in candor, by legis-
lators, interested citizens, lawyers, and commentators in discussing
obscenity law, all require explanation if the reasons for the exist-
ence of obscenity statutes are to be understood, and that Henkin's
thesis provides a very satisfying explanation. Still, having acknowl-
edged the complexity of purposiveness underlying legislation, it
would be dangerous to assume that concern with evil thought, in-
dependent of harmful conduct, is the sole justification which can be
offered for obscenity laws. Recall, for example, the mention above
of the numerous legislative findings which conclude that exposure
to obscene matter is conducive not only to immoral thoughts, but to
demonstrable social disorders as well.61  The obvious conclusion is
that the kind of material proscribed under authority of obscenity
legislation must necessarily vary depending upon which of these
evils is seen as the primary target. Here we have arrived at the
cross-roads of obscenity litigation. For such a conclusion raises
the all-important issue of whether the first amendment allows cen-
sorship solely on the basis of the community's moral sensibility.
IV. PROSCRIPTION AND THE CONSTITUTION
It is not necessary for our purposes here to trace the changes in
first amendment doctrine since the 1821 banning of Fanny Hill in
Massachusetts. Despite the historical truth and dimensions of the
proposition that society "has traditionally concerned itself with the
moral soundness of its people as well [as with their physical well-
being],"62 the first amendment has nonetheless come to forbid en-
forcement by law of religious notions of morality or psychologically
comforting notions of propriety. It is clear today, for example, that
6 1 See notes 3-4 supra & accompanying text Arguably such findings are mere ra-
tionalizations for what is in reality morality legislation. However, it would be unaccep-
table for courts to psychoanalyze in this manner, thus giving less effect to a statute than
that called for by legislative pronouncements and Supreme Court approval.
62 Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497,545 (1960) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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expressions may not be suppressed because they are sacrilegious."3
Nor may suppression be justified on the grounds that the expression
challenges a traditional moral belief, such as the wrongfulness of
adultery.64
On the other hand, assuming the validity of Henkin's thesis, it
has been demonstrated that a major historical reason underlying the
enactment of obscenity statutes was the desire to impose a standard
of morality upon those expressionists who sought to disseminate
their materials for use by the general public. Unless reinterpreted,
therefore, this thesis serves to defeat the constitutional permissibil-
ity of such legislative intent. As Henkin himself suggested,6 5 his
rationale leads to the logical conclusion that obscenity statutes now
rest upon constitutionally defective foundations. In short, we are
faced with a situation in which a literal interpretation of the first
amendment forbids morality legislation and an historical interpreta-
tion of obscenity statutes concludes that they are - at least in part
attempts to pontificate on moral questions.
Yet the Supreme Court, in Roth v. United States,66 has upheld
the constitutionality of statutes which bar obscenity as determined
by the following standard: "[W]hether to the average person, ap-
plying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of
the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interests.16 7 Can
an historically valid thesis which leads to a conclusion of imper-
missible statutory purpose be reconciled with a Supreme Court ad-
judication which compels a conclusion of permissible purpose?
A. The Proper Reconciliation of Roth and the Henkin Analysis
The Roth test must be considered as both a "yes" and a "no"
answer to the demands of the stringent censors. Proscription as a
method of enforcing the psychological assertions which underlie
a concern with obscenity as sin - the obscene poisons minds, ema-
nates from hostile sources, and hence justifies protection of "others"
from its effects - is not constitutionally permissible. But in light
of legislative findings that the circulation of some publications de-
monstrably contributes to social disorders,68 a challenged publica-
63 Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
64 Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of New York, 360 U.S. 684 (1959).
65 Henkin, supra note 29, at 402.
66 354 U.S. 476, rehearing denied, 355 U.S. 852 (1957).
67 Id. at 489.
6 8 See notes 3-4 supra & accompanying text.
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tion may be proscribed, under the Roth test, if sufficient evidence
can be presented to show that the challenged work might specifi-
cally contribute to these disorders."9 Thus there exists a necessary
dichotomy between morality legislation and constitutionally permis-
sible regulatory legislation, and the constant reminder which is pro-
vided by Henkin's thesis plays no small part in drawing that fine
line for purposes of obscenity litigation. Empirical evidence of a
work's potential contribution to social disorders must be presented
primarily through expert testimony, and that evidence may not con-
sist of mere repetitions under oath concerning an expert's unsub-
stantiated psychological assertions in the form of expressions of
agreement that the challenged matter is "immoral," "harmful," or
even "obscene." Such value judgments imply that the legislature in-
tended only to impose standards of morality and do not help the trier
of fact to answer the (constitutionally permissible) question of
whether the work is so socially disruptive that it must be regulated
by proscription.
This formulation of permissible statutory purpose takes account
of the historical motivation behind obscenity legislation, the con-
stitutional limitations which have come to impinge upon -the original
purposes, and Roth's approval of proscription in a manner which
observes the narrow standards demanded by the first amendment.
Moreover, the formulation suggests the direction to be pursued in
gathering the information required to determine whether or not the
challenged material is "obscene" - or in more candid terms,
whether as a matter of policy it should be banned. If the goal is
to discover whether or not the publication at issue falls within the
legislatively established category of the demonstrably dangerous,
and not to discover how many "experts" are willing to agree or dis-
agree with the general bias against "obscenity," certain evidentiary
conclusions naturally follow - for example, that no good purpose
is served by introducing the testimony of average citizens concern-
ing their personal opinions as to whether a challenged publication
is decent or not.70  Presentation of lay opinion merely tells the
judge and jury what is already known: that some in the community
69 To be sure, such evidence need not show that there is a direct contribution to
social disorders. Subsequent interpretation of the Roth test has illustrated that a work
may be proscribed if it is "utterly without redeeming social value." See notes 114-15
infra & accompanying text.
70 United States v. 4200 Copies Int'l Journal, 134 F. Supp. 490, 493 (E.D. Wash.
1955).
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find the material at hand objectionable and others do not.7' Such
lay opinion speaks only for the individual on the stand and gives no
notion of the extent to which the opinion is held in the community
generally.72  Indeed, where the challenged matter is not esoteric
but (adjudged) commonly apparent to average persons living in
the community, "the ordinary judge or juror [is] able to recognize
the nature of (its] appeal to the average man"78 and even "expert
testimony" becomes unnecessary, if not meaningless.
Normally, however, experts should be called upon - as laymen
are not - to help the court inform itself before deciding whether or
not the matter at hand warrants the suppression authorized by the
applicable statute. Lay opinion is superfluous because the very ex-
istence of the statute, along with the fact that a public prosecutor or
administrator has seen fit to initiate legal action, establishes dis-
taste for sexually frank publications. Expertise is necessary to help
the court determine whether or not this adverse opinion can be
focused, through the medium of the Roth test, into sufficiently
specific and demonstrable evaluations to permit a judgment against
the material at issue. Expert witnesses are, in this sense, called
upon for the purpose of holding "hearings," once the latter are au-
thorized by an obscenity statute. For an obscenity trial, as con-
trasted with a burglary trial, produces "legislative hearings" to make
ad hoc law; indeed, this process is required by the broad language
of the authorization. "A definition of burglary as breaking and
entering in the nighttime for the purpose of committing a felony
has a flatly tangible quality to it. There is going to be no equiva-
lent in the law of obscenity."74 The adjective "obscene," then, sim-
ply expresses a decision made by an authorized tribunal that, on a
balance of policy, a given publication should or should not enjoy
continued circulation.
This notion of legislation through litigation is not unique to
obscenity law. Wherever legislative proscriptions are expressed in
intentionally vague words, courts must undertake to make law for
each case as it is presented. "  A conspicuous example occurs in the
71 Id. This was precisely the result in the case: two women testified pro, two others
cOn.
72 Cf. 7 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1918 (3d ed. 1940) (real reason for opinion rule
is superfluity of testimony).
7 3 United States v. 392 Copies of a Magazine Entitled "Exclusive," 253 F. Supp. 485,
493 (D. Md. 1966).
7 4 Frank, Obscenity: Some Problems of Values and the Use of Experts, 41 WAsH. L.
REv. 631, 633 (1966).
7 5 Professors Hart and Sacks refer to this process as one of "Reasoned Elaboration
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area of antitrust, where broad phrases such as "restraint of trade"
and "every contract, combination ...or conspiracy 76 call for ju-
dicial exegesis in the course of litigation to determine whether or
not a given business combination is socially desirable. Surely it in-
volves no usurpation of legislative dominion to suggest that litiga-
tion is a necessary part of the "legislative" process where statutory
language, such as "obscene," seems intentionally lacking in specific-
ity and purportedly represents an attempt at generally understood
and constitutionally permissible regulation. Judge Fuld of the
New York Court of Appeals wrote in 1961: "[The Roth test] can
only indicate the broad boundaries of any permissible definition of
obscenity under the United States Constitution; [it does] not pre-
tend to, and cannot, give specific content to the meaning of 'ob-
scene' as it appears in [the New York] statute." 77 Truly, it may be
said that most statutes, in inverse proportion to the specificity of
their language, include mandates for judicial definition case by case.
B. Expertise in Explication of Roth
Conceiving of obscenity litigation as part of the process of ob-
scenity legislation can aid in formulating appropriate answers to the
overriding question, "What do we wish to know before reach-
ing a judgment on this challenged publication?" These answers
will clarify the role which expertise can play in the process. Expert
witnesses should be summoned for the purpose of gathering rele-
vant information about the challenged work, not for the purpose of
forcing jurors into awed acquiescence with the experts' conclusory
opinions that the publication is or is not "obscene." The expert
should strive to instruct the court in the ways of his work, whether
it be psychology, literature, or whatever, and to explain the nature
of the judgments made in that work. This instruction best allows
the trier of fact to put the expert's particular observations into
of Avowedly Indeterminate Directions." H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS
168 (tent. ed. 1958). Cf. Kuh, Obscenity: Prosecution Problems and Legislative Sug-
gestions, 10 CATH. LAW. 285, 295 (1964): "Words like 'obscene, lewd, lascivious,
filthy, indecent,' etc., contained in New York's present Section 1141 of the Penal Law
[subsequently replaced by § 235.00 - see note 7 supra], have been often interpreted,
and are constantly being molded, by the courts. Roughly speaking, they provide a
medium for keeping pace with changes in community attitudes." Frank, supra note 74,
at 633, compares the elusiveness of "obscenity" to that of "due process of law," "bur-
den on interstate commerce," and "flash of genius."
76 Sherman Act §§ 1, 3, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 3 (1964). See Chicago Bd. of Trade v.
United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
77 People v. Richmond County News, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 578, 585-86, 216 N.Y.S.2d
369, 375, 175 N.E.2d 681, 685 (1961).
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proper perspective so that it can be ultimately determined whether
the work might contribute to "social disorders." With this in mind,
we can turn to a more particular explanation of how the legislative
facts called for 'by the Roth test are best identified in a legislative
obscenity trial.7
(i) Dominant Theme.- The first branch of the Roth test
focuses upon the dominant theme of the whole work, with a par-
ticular concern for the theme's appeal to a prurient interest in sex.
It may, of course, be questioned whether a book or film has a domi-
nant theme" and further whether the notion of dominant theme
has any real meaning in the cases of non-narrative material such as
magazines or photographs. Yet there remains at least a limited role
which expertise can play in determining not what the real meaning
of a book or film may be, but whether some meanings are discern-
ible to trained minds which may not be perceived by those who usu-
ally give less careful attention to such works.
In accordance with the command that the work be considered
"as a whole," experts may illustrate that particular passages are
significantly related to other less sensational passages which place
the former in a cast otherwise unapparent when considered in iso-
lation. 0 This was the service performed by Professor Lionel Trill-
ing in a trial challenging Edmund Wilson's Memoirs of Hecate
County.8' Similarly, a literary historian may be able to discern not
only webs of connection between different parts of the book itself,
but connections between the book and contemporaneous works
which highlight a theme many readers might tend to overlook.
82
7 8 For discussions of the uses of expert testimony under the Roth test, see Com-
ment, Expert Testimony in Obscenity Cases, 18 HAST. L.J. 161 (1966); Note, The Use
of Expert Testimony in Obscenity Litigation, 1965 Wis. L. REv. 113.
7 0 R. KUi, supra note 1, at 38. Cf. United States v. One Carton Positive Motion
Picture Film Entitled "491," 247 F. Supp. 450, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 1965): '"The question of
the recognition of the dominant theme is connected with the question as to who is to
make the recognition."
80 See Tokikuni, Obscenity and the Japanese Constitution, 51 KY. LJ. 703, 707
(1963): Expert opinions appear to be very effective in helping the court to decide "the
relevancy of the specific objectionable portrayals to the development of the dominant
theme of the material as a whole." It is not a question of the expert's reading in a pruri-
ent theme which the average man could not discern. For that average man has already
become aware of the particularly sensational passages. Rather it is a question of the ex-
pert relating all passages so that the court may determine whether the dominant theme
(if it exists at all) has breached the standards imposed by Roth. The less sensational
passages may make the more sensational appear even worse, and at the same time dictate
a dominant theme.
81 Lockhart & McClure, Literature, the Law of Obscenity, and the Court, 38 MINN.
L REV. 295, 298 (1954).
8 2 For example, "Richardson believed that chastity was the most important thing in
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In such instances light can be shed on the publication at -issue be-
cause, for purposes of interrogating the witnesses, the legal stand-
ards are, -in the abstract formulation, put aside (to be applied later
by the trier of fact) and the witnesses may discuss the publication
in their own terms, much as if they were explaining to interested
students in a classroom or to interested legislators in a subcommittee
what this publication seems to be all about. These examples of
experts' explanations should be contrasted to the testimony of an
academic witness who told the court: "The dominant effect of
[this] book taken as a whole is not an appeal to prurient interest
nor shameful nor morbid interests in sex."83  Counsel who pre-
pared the latter witness's presentation little understood what courts
should properly seek to know in deciding whether given matter is
to be proscribed. Aside from the fact that no expert is qualified to
proffer legal conclusions, the tribunal probably understood less as a
result of the witness's testimony.
Attempts at suggesting aspects of the challenged matter which
may not occur to the juror can be helpful in other ways. Themes
perceived and interests appealed to will vary according to audience
and circumstances of exposure. Lockhart and McClure have sug-
gested a notion of "variable obscenity" which draws upon special-
'ized advertising and distribution techniques to permit greater un-
derstanding of the characteristics of probable purchasers and hence
of probable effects.84 For example, where it can be shown that
challenged photographs have been sent only to a scientific institute,
and not to purchasers at large, the predictability of use and effect
the world; Cleland [whose Fanny Hill was being challenged] and Fielding obviously
did not and thought there were more important and significant values." Testimony of
Brandeis Assistant Professor Ira Konigsberg, Record, supra note 2 1, at 86.
83 Gertz, supra note 47, at 601. Similarly conclusory testimony was given in Mc-
Cauley v. Tropic of Cancer, 20 Wis. 2d 134, 146, 121 N.W.2d 545, 551 (1963), and
in the Massachusetts Fanny Hill case. See Record, supra note 21, at 13, 61.
84 Lockhart & McClure, supra note 81, at 340-42. See also Lockhart & McClure,
supra note 5, at 49. The concept has been espoused by Mr. Chief Justice Warren:
Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 445-46 (1957) (dissenting opinion);
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 494-96 (concurring opinion), rehearing denied,
355 U.S. 852 (1957); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 199-203 (1964) (dissenting
opinion). See also Bookcase, Inc. v. Broderick, 18 N.Y.2d 71, 218 N.E.2d 668, 271
N.Y.S.2d 947, motion to amend remittitur denied, 18 N.Y.2d 708, 220 N.E.2d 793,
274 N.Y.S.2d 144, appeal dismissed for want of properly presented federal question
sub. nom. Bookcase, Inc. v. Leary, 385 U.S. 12, rehearing denied, 385 U.S. 943 (1966).
The use of the variable obscenity technique seems to have been approved by the rather
unexpected decision of the Supreme Court in Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463,
466 (1966) (publications viewed "against a background of commercial exploitation of
erotica solely for the sake of their prurient appeal").
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will vindicate the material.85 Similarly, psychological and psychiat-
ric investigations may be presented through expert testimony to
show that "the potential effect of a sexual stimulus is affected by
the situation in -which the material is presented, as well as the erotic
content of the material observed."86 Indeed, it may be proven
that apparently titillating material actually arouses disgust, shame,
or other unpleasant reactions in the minds of some whose histories
reflect certain patterns of experience.S7  Showings both of special
audience and of special conditions of exposure may emphasize the
perception of Susan Sontag that "[,t]here's a sense in which all
knowledge is dangerous, the reason being that not everyone is in the
same condition as knowers or potential knowers." 88
Counsel should present such data through expert witnesses not
to obtain an opinion from the witness which expresses his legal
judgment concerning the dominant theme's appeal to prurient inter-
est, but to provide the trier of fact with a sufficiently full array of
professional observations in order to render unlikely a hasty assump-
tion that the publication at issue will affect everyone it reaches in
the same way, under all circumstances. By suggesting multiplicity
of effect, expert testimony of the kind here described is likely to
plant proper doubts in the minds of judge and jury about the de-
sirability of proscription in light of inconclusive "legislative facts."89
However, room is left for the discounting of expert testimony
where the inconclusiveness of the data seems fabricated and the
fact-finder is confidently prepared to say that the situations in which
proscription is unnecessary are too few to stand in the way of a de-
termination that the massive effect of the challenged material will
be an appeal to prurient interest.
(ii) The Average Man.- The second branch of the Roth test
requires the touchstone for prurient interest to be the average man.
Publications may not be denied general circulation because of their
85 United States v. 31 Photographs, 156 F. Supp. 350 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (customs
bar of photographs sent to Kinsey Institute; "average man" test held inapplicable);
People v. Marler, 199 Cal. App. 2d 889, 18 Cal. Rptr. 923 (1962) (distribution re-
stricted to medical use).
8 6 Cairns, Paul & Wishner, supra note 13, at 1026.
87 Id. at 1032-33.
8 8 Sontag, supra note 19, at 211.
89 Cf. Larrabee, The Cultural Context of Sex Censorship, 20 LAW & CONThmP.
PROB. 672, 686 (1955): '"he vanity of lawyers in assuming that the law has a signifi-
cant effect on sexual habits is matched by the vanity of writers in assuming that litera-
ture has a comparable effect. Fortunately, there are other forces at work determining
conduct." The assertion is reiterated in Larrabee, Pornography Is Not Enough,
HARPER's, Nov. 1960, at 87, 88.
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probable effect on children ° or on the immature, irresponsible, or
abnormally sensual. 1 Here, the area for expertise would seem
quite limited, for the jury has been convened precisely for the pur-
pose of rendering its collective opinion as to the applicability of
the relevant legal standard to the facts of the case. 2 The trier of
fact, not the witness, must decide whether the matter at issue has a
given effect on the average man, who has been compared with the
reasonable man of tort law;93 and at least one tribunal has held that
the term needs no further explanation in the court's charge.9
The possibility does remain, however, that the fact-finder may
be unaware of wide spread psychological characteristics which, if
brought to his attention, would modify somewhat his notion of the
average man. For example, though it may be improper to admit
psychiatric testimony concerning effects of photographs on a test
group which is deviant by definition,95 it will be proper to allow a
psychiatrist to testify to the effects of a film upon the viewer's un-
conscious.96 A sensible resolution would be to decide preliminarily
whether the challenged work is of an esoteric nature, unfamiliar to
average persons, or is of a kind commonly seen in the community.
Only in the former case would expertise be required to lay the basis
for a judgment of the effect on the average man.97
Furthermore, where witnesses who have developed professional
contacts with the public over a period of time are permitted to
testify about the characteristics observed in those with whom they
deal, the testimony should not be elicited to present the witness's
idea of the average man. Rather, as above, the testimony should be
aimed at producing a more careful assessment by the fact-finder of
his own idea concerning the average man, with slight modifications
suggested by the special experiences of the witness. The remarks of
90 Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957). Note, however, the other side of the
coin. The Supreme Court has recently held that the states may promulgate a separate
and more restrictive definition of obscenity for minors, so as to prevent access by chil-
dren to publications which are not considered obscene for adults. Ginsberg v. New
York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
911n re Louisiana News Co., 187 F. Supp. 241 (E.D. La. 1960); Maryland State
Bd. of Motion Picture Censors v. Times Film Corp., 212 Md. 454, 129 A.2d 833
(1957); Goldstein v. Commonwealth, 200 Va. 25, 104 S.E.2d 66 (1958).
92 See 7 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1917, at 7 (3d ed. 1940).
93 State v. Nelson, 168 Neb. 394, 95 N.W.2d 678 (1959).
9 4 State v. Jungdaus, 176 Neb. 641, 126 N.W.2d 858 (1964).
9 5 Volanski v. United States, 246 F.2d 842 (6th Cir. 1957).
96 State v. Scope, 46 Del. 591, 86 A.2d 154 (New Castle County Super. Ct. 1952).
9 7 See United States v. 392 Copies of a Magazine Entitled "Exclusive," 253 F. Supp.
485 (D. Md. 1966).
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Dr. Robert Gosling, a psychoanalyst, are suggestive of the proper
perspective in which to place direct and cross-examination of a wit-
ness who claims insight into the average man through professional
confrontations:
One sort of information we are left with is derived from the anec-
dotal experience of a variety of observers, be they magistrates,
social workers, ministers, psychiatrists or whatever. Each one
comments on the experience he has had in his own limited field.
. . . Apart from inaccurate observation the chief source of
error in this method comes from the limitations of the field of ex-
perience, that is, from making generalizations from the relatively
few particular cases that have been seen. Any such observer's field
is limited by external circumstances, and his powers of observation
are restricted by a variety of factors, such as his expectations, his
conceptual framework and his personal bias. So whenever some-
one reports his findings in such an anecdotal way, particularly if
he then propounds a firm conclusion that has widespread implica-
tions, it is important to inspect closely the selection of his data,
how they were collected and what were left out. In particular in
the problem under discussion one would question whether the par-
ticular selection of the people who came the observer's way and
were prepared to disclose their sexual secrets was in any way repre-
sentative of the population that enjoys pornography.98
(iii) The Contemporary Community.- In any given case, the
finder of fact must apply "contemporary community standards";
but this final facet of the (literal) Roth test does not appear sus-
ceptible to the introduction of expert testimony. 9 Inevitably, much
confusion concerning the relevance of such testimony shall flow
from the inherent uncertainty as to the scope of the community
whose standards are to be applied. Moreover, the absolute lan-
guage of the majority opinion in Jacobellis v. Ohio'0° seemingly
negates the possibility that expert witnesses are necessary to assess
the boundaries of any local community:
It has been suggested that the "contemporary community standard"
aspect of the Roth test implies a determination of the constitution-
al question of obscenity in each case by the standards of the particu-
lar local community from which the case arises. This is an incor-
rect reading of Roth. . . . [T]he concept of obscenity [has] "a
varying meaning from time to time" - not from county to county,
or town to town.
We do not see how any "local" definition of the "community"
could properly be employed in delineating the area of expression
98 Gosling, supra note 53, at 62-63 (emphasis added).
99 Cf. Note, Obscenity Prosecution: Artistic Value and the Concept of Immunity, 39
N.Y.U.L. REV. 1063, 1076 (1964): "The critic has no expertise in this area; in fact, his
qualifications are suspect because his principal concern is the artistic merit of the work."
100 378 U.S. 184 (1964).
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that is protected by the Federal Constitution.... We thus reaffirm
the position taken in Roth to the effect that the constitutional status
of an allegedly obscene work must be determined on the basis of a
national standard. It is, after all, a national Constitution we are
expounding.1o'
True, the above portion of Mr. Justice Brennan's opinion may be
considered dictum, and only one other Justice concurred in the sub-
stantive analysis set forth. 02 But it represents a major premise in a
Supreme Court syllogism which defeated proscription, and - even
more significant - the precise question as to the scope of the com-
munity has yet to be ruled upon by the Court in a manner adverse
to this "national standard" thesis.
Recent lower court opinions have also recognized the inappro-
priateness of parochial nets being cast in a nationwide stream of
material,' 03 particularly where federal statutes have been involved.'04
There are, however, rumblings of dissent in a number of decisions
which have held admissible evidence of community standards;'0 5
indeed, two cases have gone so far as to hold exclusion of such
evidence a denial of due process of law.0"' But this evidence is
overwhelmingly of a kind not within the scope of the present dis-
cussion, for it places no real reliance on professional expertise.
Rather it manifests an effort to demonstrate that matter equally or
more objectionable than that at issue continues to circulate freely in
the community. 10 7 Evidence of this nature is usually garnered for
the witness by counsel, who simply obtains locally sold publications
similar to the one at issue and then seeks to put them into evi-
dence.108
101 Id. at 192-95, citing Judge Learned Hand in United States v. Kennerley, 290 F.
119, 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1913).
102 378 U.S. at 197-98 (Goldberg, J., concurring). Mr. Chief Justice Warren spe-
cifically rejected the idea of a national community standard. Id. at 199, 200 (dissenting
opinion).
'
0 3 See State v. Hudson County News Co., 41 N.J. 247, 196 A.2d 225 (1963).
1
0 4 See United States v. One Carton Positive Motion Picture Film Entitled "491,"
247 F. Supp. 450 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (relevant "community" under Tariff Act § 305, 19
U.S.C.A. § 1305 (1965), is the national community).
1 05 United States v. West Coast News Co., 228 F. Supp. 171 (W.D. Mich. 1964),
a I'd, 357 F.2d 855 (6th Cir. 1966); Landau v. Fording, 245 Cal. App. 2d 820, 54 Cal.
Rptr. 177 (1966); Yudkin v. State, 229 Md. 223, 182 A.2d 798 (1961).
1061n re Harris, 56 Cal. 2d 879, 366 P.2d 305, 16 Cal. Rptr. 889 (1961); People
v. Aday, 226 Cal. App. 2d 520, 38 Cal. Rptr. 199, cert denied, 379 U.S. 931 (1964).
10 7 See Yudkin v. State, 229 Md. 223, 182 A.2d 798 (1961). See also Gertz, supra
note 47, at 604.
108 Such extraneous literary material was held inadmissible in People v. Finkelstein,
11 N.Y.2d 300, 183 N.E.2d 661, 229 N.Y.S.2d 367, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 863 (1962).
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The only basis upon which one could arguably claim expertise
in the matter of community standards would be through a statistical
analysis of community opinion on a given matter by random sam-
pling. Yet, even if it could be shown that non-distorting techni-
ques had been employed to ascertain that the very matter at issue
was considered unobjectionable by a significant majority of those
queried, 09 the circumstances under which those individual opinions
had been given to the pollster or sociologist - lacking the focused
solemnity of a judicial setting - would seem so informal, nonpar-
ticularized in purpose, and free from imposition of legal respon-
sibility that they would perforce be rendered useless as an aid to the
fact-finder in his application of contemporary community stand-
ards.110 An example is provided by the factual situation in Mc-
Cauley v. Tropic of Cancer."' One dissenting judge had been
overly impressed by the testimony of a witness who was manager of
a local book distributor and examined books returned unsold from
outlets where they had been on display; for the witness's testimony,
that all of the 170 supermarkets and 98 percent of the drugstores
involved refused to carry the challenged book,"x2 was surely incom-
petent to show contemporary community standards. This dissenter
obviously had overlooked the possibility - indeed, the near cer-
tainty - that the book's rejection by retailers resulted from fear of
legal action, not an expression of substantive judgment on the part
of the merchants. 113 Also left unexplained was how a merchant
who refuses to sell a book can be taken to speak for his customers
regarding their collective standard of acceptable writing, for these
same customers may well have taken the opportunity to purchase
the book elsewhere or may have failed to exercise their prerogative
to buy because of a myriad of unknown reasons.
The case was criticized in Note, Obscenity - Admissibility of Evidence of Contem po-
rary Community Standards, 12 DEPAUL L. REv. 337 (1963).
10 9 See AmBicAN CML LBERTIES UNION, WHAT'S OBscENE? 3 (1944), where
there appears the result of a publisher's survey of opinion concerning the controversial
Varga drawings in the old Esquire magazine.
110 See generally Elgin Nat'l Watch Co. v. Elgin Clock Co., 26 F.2d 376 (D. Del.
1928). But cf. Zeisel, The Uniqueness of Survey Evidence, 45 CORN. LQ. 322, 336-37
(1960).
11120 Wis. 2d 134, 121 N.W.2d 545 (1963).
112 Id. at 158, 121 N.W.2d at 553 (Hallows, J., dissenting). Market surveys may
reflect accurately consumer demand if a sufficient cross section of the geographical area
is polled; but such surveys relate little concerning the consumer's evaluative judgment of
a particular product or publication. Another problem raised by these statistics is the
hearsay rule of evidence; yet the court in this case did not deem it necessary to delve
into this "admissibility" enigma. See notes 140-44 infra & accompanying text.
113 Cf. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 194 (1964).
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If placed in the proper perspective, the issue of "contemporary
community standards" will arise only after the gathering of infor-
mation about the challenged work has been completed; and the ex-
pert can be of help to a court in the latter process alone. Once the
experts have described and interpreted the effects of a given pub-
lication - albeit upon the "average man" - it becomes the task
of the trier of fact to assess those descriptions and ask himself
whether the probable effects thereof may bring the work into con-
flict with contemporary community standards. If the experts are
not to be the assessors of their own explanations, their task must
end with descriptions of the work's effects. The trier of fact bears
the responsibility of deciding what legal conclusion - vindication
or proscription - will be drawn from the testimony, and implicit
in this determination as to legal conclusion is the requirement that
the court must enunciate the (legal) standards of the community.
C. The Crux of the Roth Test: Social Value and the English Al-
ternative.
The issue upon which most expert testimony is presented has
been identified by Mr. Justice Brennan (in Fanny Hill) as one of
the three "coalescing elements" which constitute the Roth test in its
current form: "Whether the material is utterly without redeeming
social value.'"11 4  It is extremely important to note that under this
test, obscenity has become a function of social value. In other
words, whatever the word "obscene" may mean in American law,
it implies at least in part a lack of social value. And absent this lack
of social value, proscription is not constitutionally permissible:
A book cannot be proscribed unless it is found to be utterly with-
out redeeming social value. This is so even though the book is
found to possess the requisite prurient appeal and to be patently
offensive. Each of the three federal constitutional criteria is to
be applied independently; the social value of the book can neither
be weighed against nor canceled by its prurient appeal or patent
offensiveness." 5
On the other hand, the English notion of "obscenity" does not
depend upon the existence or absence of social value; rather, the
114A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney
General, 383 U.S. 413, 418 (1966). The other two coalescing elements, of course, are
(1) whether "the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to a prurient
interest in sex" and (2) whether "the material is patently offensive because it affronts
contemporary community standards relating to the description or representation of
sexual matters." Id.
115 383 U.S. at 419.
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existence of such value is an independent defense for a work which
may be concededly "obscene."""' The English have not succeeded
any more than we in attempting to define "obscenity." Yet their
analysis is extremely significant; for in the eyes of the English law,
a publication can be both obscene and of social value. Our law
denies that this is so; and it puritanically insists that whatever is
obscene necessarily lacks social value. This insistence that legal ob-
scenity and worth are mutually exclusive accounts for much of the
critical dissatisfaction with our law's treatment of art, literature,
and the less aspirant entertainments.1 7  More importantly, however,
it accounts for much confusion in the assessment of the utility of
expert testimony. Because the American defendant cannot put
aside the perplexing task of explaining that his publication is not
obscene, as can the English defendant by simply conceding the is-
sue and proceeding to try only the defense of social value, the Amer-
can defendant is constantly tempted to stray from the critical issue
of social value and ask his expert witnesses to agree merely that his
publication is not obscene. Some examples from trial records dem-
onstrate this tendency:
Professor Harry Levin [testifying for the intervenor in the Tropic
of Cancer case]: "I think one must distinguish between indecent
things in a book and an indecent book. This book is about in-
decent modes of life. It is not an indecent book."
Q. "And yet you do not consider the book obscene. 'Yes' or
'No.' "
A. "I am afraid I will have to say more than 'Yes' or 'No.'"
Q. [Would Shakespeare's Rape of Lucrece be more likely to
arouse lustful desire in the normal adult than Tropic of Cancer?]
A. "Mr. London, I am an expert in comparative literature, not
in comparative lust."" 8
And:
Professor John Bullitt [testifying for the intervenor in the Fanny
Hill case]:
116 Obscene Publications Act of 1959, 7 & 8 Eliz. ch. 2, c. 66, § 4 (1959).
117 See generally Alpert, Judicial Censorship of Obscene Literature, 52 HARV. L.
REV. 40 (1938); Miller, Obscenity and the Law of Reflection, 51 Ky. L.J. 577 (1963);
Note, Obscenity Prosecution: Artistic Value and the Concept of Immunity, 39 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 1063 (1964). See also M. ERNST & W. SEAGLE, supra note 2, at 229. No com-
mentator has noted, however, that the American standard puts upon the prosecution
the burden of showing absence of social value while the English independent defense
puts upon the defendant the burden of showing social value.
"
8 Intervenor's Appeal, supra note 16, at 227, 229, 244.
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Q. "Do you believe that the reader of this book would have
aroused in him or her prurient interest?"
A. "What reader?"
Q. "The average reader in the community to whom this book be-
comes available."
A. "Your Honor, do I have to answer that Yes or No when I
find it very difficult? I am no sociologist, Your Honor; I am a
professor of English."
Q. "Let me rephrase it."
A. "I am not a sexologist. I am not a professional in this
matter."
Q. "Is the book obscene in your opinion?"
A. "I have no opinion on obscenity."
And:
Professor Robert W. Sproat [also testifying for the intervenor in
Fanny Hill]:
Q. "Do you feel that the book arouses prurient interest in the
reader?"
A. "Well, once again, I do feel that I cannot judge. I am not
qualified to judge this matter. This is a matter for a sociolo-
gist.""l 9
Questions such as these, which are framed in conclusory legal
terms, could be regarded as simply the product of counsel's failure
to keep in mind the witness's particular competence. In the alter-
native, one might deem them proof of a mere failure to prepare a
more searching interrogation; and either of these failures could be
based upon a lack of understanding about the different concepts of
obscenity likely to be employed by men of literature.' But in the
final analysis what appears is the all too obvious fact that no such
justifications would be required if American law were not in its
present complex and ambiguous state. There would be far less of
this tendency to pull from the witness his opinion on the ultimate
legal issue of obscenity if, as under the English law, the obscenity of
the work could be conceded, or at least separated out in litigation,
so that the question of particular value or merit could be explored
on its own terms.
The English concept, despite its dissimilarity from the Roth and
Fanny Hill notion of the inconsistency between obscenity and social
value, does suggest a more useful way to present expert testimony.
Implicit in the English rule is the premise that experts on the issue
119 Record, supra note 21, at 61-62, 65.
120 See notes 8-19 supra & accompanying text
OBSCENITY
of social value shall have no concern with whether the publication
is obscene, for the value which the experts may perceive in a work
would vindicate it regardless of its obscenity. This same separation
of concerns is appropriate, for evidentiary purposes, where an Amer-
can court is searching for social value, even though the finding on
that issue is crucial to the ultimate determination of obscene vel non.
Under both the American and the English tests, demonstration of
the existence of social value results in vindication of the challenged
publication. In both schemata, therefore, experts on the issue of so-
cial value are best utilized by means of interrogation on that precise
issue, with obscenity having been put aside as beyond the experts'
concern.
121
Once obsession with the expert's opinion about the material's
obscenity has been overcome, specific and competence-related infor-
mation can be evoked from that witness. An excellent example is
offered by the testimony of a clinical psychologist in the case of
Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day.22 Using the standards of the
American Psychological Association as his frame of reference, he
testified that another psychologist's published answers to questions
submitted by readers of the challenged magazine were unethical' 23
and thus could not support a finding of social value. 24 Yet an-
other example of helpful testimony was that of public health au-
thorities, welfare workers, and educators to the effect that a widely
circulated magazine's pictorial article, The Birth of a Baby, served
a needed educational purpose, in light of widespread ignorance
about childbirth."2 5
Particularly pertinent responses such as these, however, are not
likely to result from questions by counsel which put the burden of
'
2 1 See Frank, supra note 74, at 664. Experts, of course, may sometimes be em-
ployed on issues concerning the other two coalescing elements of the Roth test; but the
social value issue is the crux of that test and, as such, the issue at which most expert
testimony should be directed. As Mr. Justice Brennan has pointed out, without an ab-
sence of social value there can be no finding of obscenity. See note 115 supra & ac-
companying text.
122 370 U.S. 478 (1962).
123 Record at 37-38, Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478 (1962).
2 4 Id. The defendant had sought to have the average homosexual deemed the
sole class for whom the social value of this "male nudie" magazine was relevant. While
the publication of answers to these readers in a widely distributed psychological journal
may have been considered an attestation of (at least) minimum social value inherent
in the magazine or even in homosexuality itself, the testimony of the clinical psycholo-
gist operated to defeat such presumptions and to disprove the possibility that there was
any social value in the magazine even if the relevant class were narrowed to that of the
average homosexual.
2 5 See People v. Larsen, 5 N.Y.S.2d 55 (Ct. of Spec. Sess. Bronx County 1938).
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selection on the witness. When asked merely for an example of
John Cleland's literary merit (in the Fanny Hill case), Professor
John Bullitt responded:
There is a rather careful effort here to delineate this person. The
early Phoebe, who is "red-faced, fat in her early 50's, who wad-
dles into a room." She doesn't walk in, she waddles in.
This kind of writing is very skillfully done. It is a work of
an artist.126
Significantly, this rather trifling answer was seized upon (with some
justification, I suggest) by Mr. Justice Clark, whose opinion was
highly dubious of the light shed on the book by such testimony.12
In stark contrast to the seeming lack of preparation which contri-
buted to this ultimately damaging piece of hit-and-miss interroga-
tion was the thorough self-education process by which counsel in-
formed himself in the Ulysses case.128  Counsel so effectively ex-
plained and drew from his expert the stream-of-consciousness style
of the author, James Joyce, that Judge Woolsey confessed that, until
counsel's explanation, the significance of Joyce's unusual style had
escaped him. 29
The conclusion must be that the expert most successfully sug-
gests social value when he is permitted (indeed, led by counsel) to
discuss the publication at issue on his own terms, in light of the pur-
poses and techniques applicable to his own field. From this par-
ticularized testimony, the trier of fact may select those indicators of
usefulness which seem to him relevant to the "community" beyond
the expert's. The expert should not be called upon for a substan-
tive definition of "social value"; rather, he must offer specific ob-
servations which, if accepted, will help the trier of fact construct a
more general notion of "social value."
126 Record, supra note 21, at 57.
127 A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney
General, 383 U.S. 413, 441-55 (dissenting opinion) (1966). Regarding Professor
Bullitt's testimony which is quoted in the text, Judge Clark confined himself to one
sarcastic reply: "Given this standard for 'skillful writing,' it is not surprising that he
found the book to have merit." Id. at 449. He went further, however, in comment-
ing on the free-flowing testimony of other experts who had attributed much historical,
sociological, and literary appeal to the author's wordy descriptions of the sexual act and
references to the male sexual organ as an engine. "How this adds social value to the
book is beyond my comprehension. It only indicates the lengths to which these ex-
perts go in their effort to give the book some semblance of value." Id. at 449-50.
12 8 United States v. One Book Called "Ulysses," 5 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1933),
a 'd sub. nomu. United States v. One Book Entitled Ulysses, 72 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934).
12 9 M. ERNsT & A. SCHWARTz, supra note 20, at 95-96.
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V. PERTINENT RULES OF EVIDENCE
A. Relevancy and Due Process
At this point it becomes mandatory to ask whether the rules of
evidence permit testimony which is several steps removed from the
ultimate issue of obscenity and the component issues of the Roth
test. Certain objections can be anticipated to testimony which dis-
cusses the challenged publication only in the expert's own terms,
whether they be literary, psychological, or otherwise, and not in
terms of "prurient interest," "social value," or "obscenity." Most of
these objections will be made to admissibility on the grounds of
relevance.180  The reason usually given is that the trained critic is,
by definition, not an average man, and hence the critic's response is
irrelevant to the question of what the average man's responses
would be, or what community standards may be.'81 In Grove
Press, Inc. v. Christenberry,3 2 the concurring opinion stated:
I do not imply that the views of Jacques Barzun, Edmund Wilson,
Archibald MacLeish, and other critics mentioned by the majority,
are not entitled to consideration and respect. My point is simply
that literary critics generally do not represent that hypothetical
character, the average reader. It is this individual with whom a
judge or administrative official must inevitably be concerned. 183
Unfortunately, such objections misconceive the function of the
expert. He does not take -the stand to speak for the average man -
obviously, quite the contrary is the case. What the objections over-
look is that the average man, while not as critically perceptive as the
expert, may nevertheless be capable of some of the expert's percep-
tion. The continuously growing availability of higher education -
along with the unprecedented communication of critical views
through books, periodicals, and "educational" radio and television
- surely indicates that the average man and the trained critic do
not live in mutual incommunicado. The expert takes the stand
130 For example, the views of so-called "literary experts" have been held to be ir-
relevant in proceedings under section 305 of the Tariff Act, 19 U.S.C.A. § 1305 (1965).
See United States v. Two Obscene Books, 92 F. Supp. 934 (N.D. Cal. 1950) (motion
to take depositions denied; obscenity can be determined from books themselves and any
testimony concerning books' literary value would be irrelevant and immaterial); United
States v. Two Obscene Books, 99 F. Supp. 760 (N.D. Cal. 1951) (books found to be
obscene within the meaning of the statute). The two books involved were authored by
Henry Miller and entitled Tropic of Cancer and Tropic of Capricorn. Note the con-
clusory caption which was given to the case.
13 1 See United States v. West Coast News Co., 228 F. Supp. 171 (W.D. Mich.
1964), aff'd, 357 F.2d 855 (6th Cir. 1966).
132 276 F.2d 433 (2d Cit. 1960).
133 Id. at 439 n.1 (Moore, J., concurring).
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not to embody the average man, but to suggest to the fact-finder
that certain perceptions are possible and perhaps probable in light
of an informed examination of the challenged work. It seems
highly unlikely that either judge or juror will be so uncomplimen-
tary to his own intelligence as to suppose the critic's observation
about a given passage utterly beyond his (the judge's or juror's)
grasp. But the fact-finder may easily suppose that a sensible inter-
pretation is likely to occur to most sensible readers, though per-
haps with less of the careful documentation or analysis supplied by
the expert. Expertise, in other words, is a matter of degree; it is
not the exclusive possession of the expert, whose perceptions would
therefore be irrelevant to those of the average man. Rather, the ob-
servations of one concededly an expert are of aid in considering
whether at least a portion of his perceptiveness is not shared by
most educated persons. 134
As support for this analysis, the objection to admissibility of ex-
pert testimony on grounds of relevance has met with increased ju-
dicial and legislative disfavor since Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in a
vigorous concurring opinion, argued that exclusion of such testi-
mony in a criminal case constituted a violation of due process of
law." 5 The express provision in recent statutes for the admissibility
of expert testimony'3 6 has indicated that legislatures do, indeed, in-
tend that courts hold hearings on the particular views of experts in
order to bridge the gaps between the ambiguities of obscenity laws.
Though such provisions sometimes meet with excessively narrow
interpretation, as where it is reasoned in somewhat backward fash-
ion that an obscene work does not become any less so by virtue of
134 There is no contradiction between this notion and the irrelevance of testimony
dealing with responses of deviant individuals. See text accompanying note 95 supra.
The response of the deviant is by definition outside the category of those responses by
which materials may constitutionally be adjudged obscene. The response of the expert
is one element in the total category of responses which make up the constitutional yard-
stick of "averageness," and may be considered to be shared, in varying lesser degrees,
by many within the class of average men. Another way of pointing out the difference is
to note that the deviant mind is the product of many forces which produce an abnormal
susceptibility to obscenity - deviancy is an involuntary status; expertise, on the other
hand, is voluntarily acquireable and, as we know, voluntarily acquired. One cannot
assume that the deviant response, in contrast to the expert response, will be emulated by
those within the range of the average.
135 Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 160-67 (1959) (concurring opinion).
136 See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 272, § 28F (1956); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38,
§ 11-20(c) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1969). See also ALI MODEL PENAL CODE § 251.4
(Proposed Official Draft, 1962). The Illinois statute seems defective insofar as it makes
its admissibility provision applicable to prosecutions, though the provision is apparently
utilized in non-criminal cases as well. Cf. Gertz, supra note 47, at 594-95.
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positive expert testimony,1 7 courts are undeniably becoming re-
sponsive to the need for professional non-legal help in adjudicating
what is obscene. A recent federal court decision reversed a convic-
tion in which the absence of any expert testimony on the issue of
prurient appeal was held to give the jury impermissibly broad free-
dom to speculate as to probable effects:
"Due process of law" would be a meaningless cliche if the non-
sensical trash that is the subject of this prosecution were allowed
to be the basis of a conviction by judge or jury without any proof
demonstrating that it has the proscribed effect on any of our citi-
zenry.' 38
It would appear, then, that expert testimony is not only helpful
in the course of obscenity litigation, but it is also required. Objec-
tions to the relevance of such testimony should be confined to those
instances in which the witness offers speculations which go beyond
the field of his particular competence. With well-planned ques-
tioning by counsel, moreover, these objections seldom need be made
or sustained." 9
B. Less Frequent Evidentiary Obstacles
Occasionally, other rules of evidence will provide stumbling
blocks for the expert witness. For example, it was upon the absurd
grounds of hearsay that Professor John Bullitt was prevented by the
Court from referring to a critical remark by Fielding in Tom
Jones.40 Before applying this hearsay rule to out-of-court pro-
nouncements by literary critics, judges would do well to recall Sir
Philip Sidney's famous dictum, "the poet ... nothing affirmeth and
therefore never lieth."'' If the crux of the hearsay problem is the
truth of the matter stated in these out-of-court assertions,'142 it should
be clear that the only relevant truth involved in garnering expert
opinion about allegedly obscene material is the accuracy of the state-
ment an expert not in court is said to have made. Thus, the sensible
holding in this entire area should be similar to the treatment given
'37 See People v. Wepplo, 78 Cal. App. 2d 959, 178 P.2d 853 (Los Angeles County
Super. Cr. 1947); Attorney General v. The Book Named "God's Little Acre," 326 Mass.
281, 93 N.E.2d 819 (1950).
138 United States v. Klaw, 350 F.2d 155, 170 (2d Cir. 1965).
139 Cf. note 129 supra & accompanying text.
140 Record, supra note 21, at 57. Worthy of note is the professor's meager response;
he exclaimed simply: "Sorry." Id.
141 p. SiDNEY, THE DEFENsE OF POESY 35 (A. Cook ed. 1890).
142 See UNIFoRM RULE OF EVIDENCE 63.
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published reviews by several lower courts. Operating under the
logical premise that there is no good reason to suspect that the views
expressed therein are untrue in the sense of misrepresenting the real
opinion of the writer, these courts have held such reviews - and
commentary thereon - admissible into evidence. 4 ' One must take
caution with this truth rationale, however. For hearsay objections
may be validly raised to the admission of letters especially written
and submitted for the purpose of influencing particular litigation.144
There has also been occasional resort to the "best evidence" rule
in an effort to prevent testimony by experts. Quite properly, the
rule has been held inapplicable to the expert witness's narration of
the book's contents. 14 5  The rule should, however, provide proper
grounds for objection to the witness's reliance upon a published
opinion not produced in court, though the situation will ordinarily
not arise due to the ready availability of published critiques. Finally,
the courts must remember that it is not enough to adhere merely
to the spirit of the rule. They must also recognize that, under the
uniform mode of application, the best evidence rule may be applied
only to writings.14  This apparently was forgotten by a state ap-
pellate tribunal which resorted to the rule in a case concerning a
stage play, in order to let the judge and jury see the challenged
skit actually performed in the theater rather than rely on witnesses'
accounts of the production. 147
VI. PRACTICAL PROBLEMS WITH EXPERTS
There remain for discussion several practical difficulties in the
presentation of expert testimony. These are often inevitable, but
can be mitigated if, as has often been argued throughout this
Article, the experts' role is carefully delimited. One major cause of
concern is the summoning of famous critics for the purpose of uti-
lizing their fame more than their criticism in an effort to offset the
143 United States v. Levine, 83 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1936); People ex rel. Kahan v.
Creative Age Press, 192 Misc. 188, 79 N.Y.S.2d 198 (Magis. Ct. N.Y. 1948); People v.
Brooklyn News Co., 12 Misc. 2d 768, 174 N.Y.S.2d 813 (Kings County Ct 1958).
144 Cf. People v. Viking Press, Inc., 147 Misc. 813, 264 N.Y.S. 534 (Magis. Ct.
N.Y. 1933). There are also numerous hearsay problems inherent in evidence presented
by experts in the form of statistical results from survey or opinion polls. See note 112
supra. Without delving deeply into technicalities, suffice it to say that such evidence
should properly be excluded.
14 Attorney General v. The Book Named "Serenade," 326 Mass. 324, 94 N.E.2d
259 (1950).
146 UNIFORM RULE OF EVIDENCE 70.
147 People v. Herk, 179 Misc. 450, 39 N.Y.S.2d 246 (N.Y. County Super. Ct 1942).
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expertise of opposing witnesses in the eyes of the jury. For a widely
acknowledged pundit is likely to command more lay respect simply
by virtue of his "priestly aureole."''14  A sterling example may be
found in the Jacobellis litigation where the local critic and a small
family-magazine critic were adverse to the challenged film. Bosley
Crowther of "The New York Times" and Hollis Alpert of the
"Saturday Review" upstaged the unknowns149 and won the refer-
ence to decisive expertise in the Supreme Court opinion.8"
At times, these prestigious men of letters may refuse to testify
for the prosecution, even though they consider the challenged pub-
lication disgusting, on the grounds of distaste for legal censor-
ship.1r1 But the renowned academic who does occasionally testify
for the state may be utilized for his popularity rather than his par-
ticular perception. Ludwig Marcuse has described such an instance:
The prosecution [in Smith v. Californial'5 2 had its chief witness
in the professor of literature, Frank Baxter. He was evidence of
the popularity which television bestows upon a professor, rather
than on learning. This genial man, sixty-six years old, had never
wanted to be a scholar, but only to provide his students with in-
structive entertainment; and so he engaged in the important,
praise-worthy trade of being a combination teacher and maitre de
plaisir. For many years he was the most popular man at his uni-
versity . .. .15
Similarly, when famous academics testify for the defense, they may
lend their own honor to the challenged work and lead the jury to
ask how it can condemn a work spoken well of by such good people.
Marcuse also comments on the 1960 London Lady Chatterly case:
[The defense witnesses'] professional and social glamour shone
like anything. It might have been thought: the thirty-five had
been accused - and now it was a matter of proving what wonder-
ful experts, citizens and children of God they were. . . . They
are no Bohemians, no Casanovas, no poaching bachelors. These
people giving evidence in favour of Lady C. are fathers and grand-
fathers of families. 8 4
Also in point is Sybille Bedford's impression of the effect made
upon the same London jury by the appearance of Helen Gardner,
Reader of Renaissance Literature at Oxford:
148 H. KALvEN, INDEcENcY AND THE SEvEN ARTS 76-77 (1930).
'49 Record at 117-50, 204-32, 386-406, Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1963).
250 378 U.S. at 196.
15 1R. KUH, supra note 1, at 204-06.
152361 U.S. 147 (1959).
153 L. MARCUSE, OBSCENE - THE HISTORY OF AN INDIGNATION 291 (1965).
1541d. at 239.
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[This] witness . . . turned out to be one of the most effective
and impressive witnesses of the whole case. One saw climbing
onto the witness stand a woman of homely appearance with a
pleasant, open face, the kind of person one is apt to think jury
members would welcome as a forthright and respected aunt; and
indeed some of them were lifting trusting faces at her entrance. 55
However, even the most expert of testimony can backfire if the
well-known witness is made a victim of thorough cross-examination
which arouses anti-intellectualism. A brilliant critic, known far less
without academia than within, has had his qualifications challenged
"on the grounds that he had not read the best seller, Exodus, did not
know the author, and did not recognize the name of a college pro-
fessor who gave television lectures on Shakespeare. "15"
No doubt, these subtle attempts to persuade (or dissuade) by
reputation rather than by analysis are built-in weaknesses of a system
which leaves the advocates to ferret out their own respective com-
purgators. 15 7 But if the experts are called to teach, not to pontifi-
cate, triers of fact may well discover what most students already
know: the celebrated expert can be a poor teacher. Is it not realistic
to assume that others, as well as Mr. Justice Clark, would in com-
mon sense question how instructive the professor may be who of-
fers as an example of literary merit the description of a fat woman
"waddling,"' 5 8 or who testifies with assumed authority that the
dominant effect of the book is not an appeal to prurient interest?...
The eliciting of particularized reasoning, limited to the witness's
area of competence - such as explanation why the work is pre-
scribed reading for the students in the field - is the most effec-
tive way to avoid broad, dogmatic pronouncements, resting only on
authority and conclusory generalizations which are intended to
command acquiescence rather than to communicate understanding.
The goal, properly conceived, was succinctly stated by Professor
Mason Ladd: "IT~he examination should be conducted in such
manner that a juror should be able to say, 'My conclusion is in ac-
cord with the opinion of the expert, not because he has expressed
155 Bedford, The Last Trial of Lady Chatterly, ESQUIRE, April 1961, at 132, 143.
156Note, Obscenity Prosecution: Artistic Value and the Concept of Immunity, 39
N.Y.U.L. REv. 1063, 1080-81 (1964). See Record at 224-26, People v. Fritch, 13
N.Y.2d 119, 192 N.E.2d 713, 243 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1963).
15 7 See UNIFORM RULE OF EVIDENCE 59, which authorizes court selection of expert
witnesses, but does not limit the parties in calling their own experts.
158 See notes 126-2 7 supra & accompanying text.
159 See note 83 supra & accompanying text.
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the opinion, but because he made me understand the facts in such a
way that my opinion is the same as his.' "160
One final problem of pragmatics deserves note: not all chal-
lenged works are novels of arguable merit. In fact, recent deci-
sions more often concern unpretentious publications such as "girlie"
magazines. 6 ' In this area the use of expert testimony appears dif-
ficult, if not questionable. For these non-literary publications do
not gather an accretion of professional criticism. 162  They are too
tawdry, transitory, and typical to warrant serious analysis in the or-
dinary course of their circulation.
[T]he study of law, case by case, tends to reduce the "problem"
of obscenity to the problems posed in court proceedings of a rather
specialized character, largely concerned with books and most often
with books of a special kind - those that fall somewhere between
the obvious trash and the invulnerable classic - whose publishers
are sufficiently tenacious or self-confident to sustain litigation.162
This kind of material calls for some imaginativeness on the part
of counsel who seeks to present special information. Recognizing
that academics would have been of no use, the creative lawyer in
Mishkin v. New York164 called to the stand the writers, artists, and
printers of the pulp paperbacks which were under attack. The testi-
mony there went far in providing the Court with some notion of the
social value represented by Mishkin's sordid enterprise. 165 There is
a striking parallel between the Mishkin record and that of a Senate
subcommittee which shows Samuel Roth testifying: "I would say
that my exciting style of advertising is a net that I spread among
people who have not had a chance for a very good education to get
good books into their homes. ... 166 Although such information
may not be immediately probative toward the ultimate legal issue of
obscenity, it provides a sound framework within which to begin the
all-important search for social value; and thus this kind of expert
testimony has been sanctioned by statute in states such as Illinois,
where evidence is admissible to show the "[Pjurpose of the author,
creator, publisher or disseminator."'167
160 Ladd, Expert Testimony, 5 VAND. L. REv. 414,428 (1952).
161 See, e.g., Redrup v. United States, 386 U.S. 767 (1967) (per curiam) (maga-
zines not found obscene under any Justice's test).
'
62 See Note, supra note 156, at 1073.
163 Larrabee, Pornography Is Not Enough, HAPER'S, Nov. 1960, at 87, 88.
16 383 U.S. 502, rehearing denied, 384U.S. 934 (1966).
165 Record at 173-490, Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502 (1966).
16 6 SUBCOMM. TO INVESTGATE JUVENILE DELINQUENCY, INTERIM R PORT TO
THE COMM. ON THE JUDIcIARY, S. REP. No. 2381, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 117 (1956).
1 6 7 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 11-20(c)(6) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1969).
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VII. CONCLUSION: THE LIMITS OF EXPERTISE
In the preceding portions of this Article, I have tried to point
out that many uses of expert testimony in obscenity trials cause more
confusion than enlightenment, and to suggest why this is so. It is
now appropriate to draw some general conclusions concerning the
proper function of expert testimony in the litigating process.
Virtually all of the difficulties explored - conceptual, eviden-
tiary, and practical - result from the questionable notion that all
the evidence at trial must be directed to the ultimate yes-or-no issue
of obscene vel non. In a broad sense, of course, this is true; for the
dispute over the obscenity of the work at issue is the underlying rea-
son for the presentation of any evidence whatsoever. But the mis-
conception, more precisely, is that the experts are expected to help
the fact-finder decide the ultimate issue by participating in essenti-
ally the same kind of analysis as the fact-finder himself - much as
though the fact-finder were to say to the expert, "I must decide
whether this work is 'obscene' within the meaning of our statute.
What do you think ?" Because the expert is welcomed to participate
in the decisional process in the same way as the trier of fact, so that
the latter's decision will somehow be bolstered by professional con-
sultation with the former, the roles of fact-finder and expert witness
have become fuzzy and overlapping.
Asking the expert whether or not he considers the challenged
publication to be obscene is only the most superficial manifestation
of the failure to differentiate between the roles of fact-finder and
expert witness. Such failure is more graphically demonstrated by the
phenomenon of "omniscient expertise," that is, the tendency of
counsel and jury to overlook the particular competence of the wit-
ness and to regard him as a general expert whose wisdom will be
summoned to join in the collective analysis of those less confident
in judgment. This tendency was notable in the Lady Chatterly trial
in London, where the list of cognoscenti testifying was awesome.
"[T]here had appeared," reports one observer, "a tendency to stop
treating the witnesses as literary experts, or ethical experts, or 'other
merits' experts, and just treat them as experts."168 This merging of
the fact-finder's and the expert's roles also underlies those warn-
ings by commentators that important decisions concerning censor-
168 THE TRIAL OF LADY CHATTERLY - REGINA V. PENGUIN BooKs LIMITED 117
(C. Rolph ed. 1961).
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ship may soon be turned over to a collection of randomly chosen
Ph.D.'s.169 The warning was well expressed by Ernst and Seagle:
At first glance, the critic as literary expert appears to have a
great deal to recommend him. It seems absurd that a work of
literary art should be judged not by literary standards but by the
rules of the criminal law which for the most part exclude him.
Nevertheless the remedy is worse than the disease. The fact that
vice societies at times have signified their entire willingness to
have a board of literary men pass on manuscripts in advance
should alone make us suspicious. A gift horse is to be looked
very dosely in the mouth even when he happens to be Pegasus.170
The response should be a dearer division of decisional respon-
sibilities between experts and triers of fact. This division can best be
dramatized by an analogy suggested earlier - that of the legisla-
tive hearing. 7' When the analogue is posited alongside the ob-
scenity trial, it appears that what previously may-have been thought
to be a one-step process - the summoning of experts to aid in the
judgment of obscene vel non - is more appropriately to be re-
garded as a two-step process: an initial gathering of information
about the challenged publication, and a subsequent assessment of
the witnesses' explanations and application of legal standards. The
initial step requires the observations of specially trained experts.
But the subsequent step requires that witnesses' opinions be ex-
cluded in order to give full scope to the xesponsibility of the triers of
fact. This division of the litigation into two steps provides a means
of summarizing, and synthesizing, the points raised in the course of
this Article: -
(1) The expert has his own concept of obscenity and it is
different from the legal concept, of which the essence is proscrip-
tion. The expert must be allowed to discuss the work at issue in his
own terms, in order to utilize the educational value of his testimony
and to avoid superfluous opinions which are ultimately not his to
make.
(2) Unsubstantiated notions about the evils of obscene matter
are not constitutionally permissible foundations for legal censor-
ship; but where expert witnesses can provide specific information
concerning the characteristics and effects of questionable publica-
tions, their professional observations may serve to provide an ad hoc
169 See, e.g., Chandos, Unicorns at Play, in To DEPRAvE AND CORRUPT - ORi-
GINAL STUDIES IN THE NATURE AND DEF N TON OF "OBscENrTY" 207 (J. Chandos
ed. 1962).
170 K ERNST & W. SEAGLE, supra note 2, at 213.
171 See notes 73-77 supra & accompanying text
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determination of obscenity for the particular case at hand. There-
fore, the goal of expert testimony is not to achieve a majority expert
opinion on the question whether the work is objectionable, but to
acquire an array of particularized perceptions which can be accepted
or rejected by the trier of fact in his final task of applying the Roth
test.
(3) Similarly, on issues such as the nature of the average per-
son or the existence of social value, the expert should not be called
upon to provide his own notions for acceptance by the trier of fact;
for the expert is by definition not an average person and the mean-
ing of social value extends far beyond literary merit, psychological
benefit, or any other single-faceted element of social existence. The
challenged work can be utterly lacking in literary merit, for exam-
ple, and still possess social value. 7 2 Rather, the expert should pro-
vide pieces of information with which the trier of fact is to construct
his own idea of the average person or of social value.
(4) Statutory provisions for the admission of expert testimony,
and common law rules of evidence, should work to allow a wide
scope to the eliciting of specific information and no scope whatever
to pronouncements which are either unconnected with the expert's
particular competence or related to opinions concerning the ultimate
legal issues.
(5) The undesirable side-effects of prestigious critics lining up
on either side of the case are minimized by limiting their testimony
to their respective areas of competence, by eliciting specific responses,
and by purposefully avoiding dogmatic pronouncements which push
rather than point the way.
The fact that judges and juries must bear the final responsibility
for the decisions of legal censorship may, as has been asserted,
"shackle genius to the average prejudices of the times."'7 3  But if
this is so, it is because juries and judges have been deemed by legis-
latures to be the proper bodies to determine, in Judge Learned
Hand's words, "the present critical point in the compromise be-
tween candor and shame at which the community may have arrived
here and now .... .1'4 I have tried to show that experts are not
suitable participants in these decisions as to what is obscene, but
are equipped to provide information upon which intelligent deci-
sions can be made. Hopefully, this demarcation of roles shall keep
17 2 See Chicago v. Universal Publishing & Distrib. Corp., 34 Il. 2d 250, 215 N.E.2d
251 (1966).
173 M. ERNST & W. SEAGLB, supra note 2, at 211.
174 United States v. Kennerley, 209 F. 119, 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1913).
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all participants - experts, judges, and juries - within the confines
of their respective abilities and appropriate functions. At the very
least, the analysis should make clear that at the limits of expertise
are the beginnings of the responsibilities of judge and jury.
